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York Factory and Prince of Wales's Fort; A brief history for Visitor Reception Centre Display

The history of York Factory and Prince of Wales's Fort is one characterized by mutual interaction, alternating between amicable co-operation and intense rivalry. Their propinquity resulted in an exchange in personnel, a mutual concern over the success of the fur trade, and joint responsibility towards guaranteeing Hudsons' Bay Company ascendancy over its competitors from Europe, the St. Lawrence, Red River, and the Minnesota area. Conversely, such fellowship was replaced by mistrust when interpretations of jurisdiction over the trading Indians, failed to coincide. Such rivalry was endemic to two posts which shared equal and independent status. Following the great fur trading Coalition of 1821, Prince of Wales's Fort, now referred to as Fort Churchill, assumed a secondary position to York Factory. Subordination meant that Churchill thereafter was forced to rely on York's decisions in matters of policy and that interpost competition would no longer be tolerated.

It was the search for the elusive North-West passage that had led European explorers into Hudson's Bay during the early part of the 17th Century. Continually unsuccessful in finding the sea route to Asia their attention was diverted to the fur trade potential of the region bordering James Bay. When European market conditions became favourable to profitable trade in North American beaver pelts, England and France were moved to expand their sphere of interest up along the northwest coast of Hudson's Bay, converging almost simultaneously upon the Nelson and Hayes Rivers. For half a century the battle for supremacy was waged with fluctuating degrees of enthusiasm; at its conclusion, almost by default, the Hudson's Bay Company was left in complete control of the region.

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Settlement at the "twin rivers" was of great concern to the Company. There ships could find easy anchor, goods could be stored without difficulty, and the establishment could tap the resources of the trading Indians who used both waterways. From this ideal location traders and explorers began their treks inland and opened the hitherto unknown interior to white exploration.

From York Factory the Company expanded its trade northward to Churchill River. Interested by the possibility of a lucrative trade with the northern Indians and with the added incentive of renowned mineral wealth at the "Coppermine River," personnel from York were sent to build Prince of Wales's Fort which would be used as a base for northern expansion. Eager to impress the Company's London Committee, the personnel of the new post set about negotiating a peace among warring local tribes in order to facilitate Company exploration along the northwest coast of the Bay as far as Marble Island.

Theoretically, Churchill and York Factory were designed to operate as independent trading districts with exclusive jurisdiction. However, the Company failed to define the specific boundaries of responsibility and as a result, disputes over prior right were common. Frequent arguments over the "right-of-way," in trading with neighbouring Indian tribes, disrupted the smooth operation of both trading factories. As competition from the Montreal based North West Company intensified in the late 1700s, and the Bay Company began to experience heavy economic losses, their internecine rivalry was replaced by a fraternal co-operation.

The coalition between the Hudson's Bay Company and North West Company in 1821 gave the new conglomerate a brief respite from destructive competition and the Company took the opportunity to reorganize its Northern Department into efficient trading units. Churchill and York became headquarters for their respective districts and maintained responsibility over a group of outposts. However, as the level of the fur trade moved south and west into the interior, after coastal fur resources had been depleted, Churchill lost its significance to the Company and became little more than an appendage of York Factory. The latter, because of its water connection with the interior, became the depot for the entire northwest trading network. Its administrative duties were also expanded and new personnel were added in order to meet the growing responsibilities of this position. The revivication of York Factory was, however, destined to be short lived. By the later 1850s the Company was beset by free trade competition emanating from Red River, and challenged by a revolution in transportation. The route to

York became obsolete and the fort soon lapsed into disuse.

The history of York Factory and Prince of Wales's Fort prior to 1870 is a history of both shared and unique experiences. It is highlighted by the rivalry between the English and French over the control of these bayside posts, the resultant hegemony of the Hudson's Bay Company, and, the expansion and decline of each within the context of the fur trade in the Northwest.

A Brief History of York Factory and Prince of Wales's Fort

Cabot's initial search for a sea-route leading to the spice traders of Asia spurred other explorers to venture into the region of Hudson's Bay. The first voyage through the Hudson Strait and down to the bottom of the bay, was undertaken by Henry Hudson in 1610. This was Hudson's fourth and final voyage of exploration, for, after having wintered in James Bay he was abandoned by a mutinous crew at the beginning of the return voyage (1611). Hudson's ill-fated venture into the Bay failed to advance the search for the North-West passage and resulted in no immediate profits in trade since he had only received a few furs from a lone Indian entrepreneur. However, his voyage did give some impetus to future explorers such as Button, Baffin, Munk, Fox, and James. These men also anticipated finding the elusive North-West passage but were destined to search in vain.

The Hudson Bay was to remain a "desolate, uninhabited wilderness, a scene of frustration and calamity rather than of commercial potentialities"[1] for another thirty years. Jens Munk's expedition, sponsored in 1619 by Christian II of Denmark and Norway, illustrates the immense difficulties of settling on the northwestern shores of Hudson's Bay. Munk, in company with sixty-one men, arrived at the mouth of Churchill River early in September. Some of the crew were already exhibiting symptoms of scurvy and, as Munk reported:

> I caused the sick men to be taken ashore from the ship, and there we found still some cloudberries, gooseberries...And I caused thereto a good fire to be made each day for the sick, whereby they were refreshed, and thereafter they came speedily to health again.[2]

Despite this good fortune, the crew experienced even greater difficulties when they attempted to winter on the Bay. Characteristically the weather was extremely harsh and the "temperature sank to a level no one on board had believed possible."[3]

Slowly the crew succumbed to the ravages of scurvy once again and by the end of May, 1620, only seven men were still alive. In Munk's terms his men had fallen victim to a "remarkable sickness,"

> .....for all the members and joints were shrunken so sorrowfully, with great spasms in the loins, as were a thousand knives stuck through them, and the body was a blue and brown as a bruised eye, and the whole form was utterly without strength. And the condition of the mouth was ill and wretched, for all the teeth were lose, so that we could not despatch any victuals.[4]

No respector of persons, this sickness remained endemic to all who attempted to establish settlements in the vicinity of the Churchill, the Nelson and the Hayes rivers.

After Munk's fateful expedition almost half a century elapsed before the French and the English turned their attention towards the reinvestigation of lands bordering the Hudson's Bay. The rivalry for supremacy in the bay from 1670 to 1714 was no longer motivated by the desire to find the North-West passage, but rather, by the desire to win ascendancy over a region potentially rich in furs.

In 1665 two French courier de bois, Medard Chouart, Sieur des Groseilliers and Pierre Espirit Radisson, who, "probably possessed more experience and knowledge of the French-Canadian system of fur-trading than any other two men could claim....,"[5] but were disillusioned by a lack of support from Québec, approached the English government with a plan to promote Hudson's Bay as the key to the fur riches of the North-West. As a result of their contact with the English, financial support for an expédition was obtained in 1667 through a grant from Charles II. On the 5th of June 1668, two ketches set sail for the Bay. Radisson was aboard the Eaglet and Groseillier was aboard the Nonsuch. The thrust of the two Frenchmen was commerce, not exploration, and the primary intention of the expedition became trade rather than discovery.

Although the Eaglet was forced to turn back before completing its journey, the Nonsuch navigated into James Bay where the crew wintered and successfully traded with "no fewer than three hundred Indians...."[6] A year later, even before the relative advantages of this trading expedition had been fully realized in England, negotiations were undertaken for a charter which would guarantee trading privileges in the area of Hudson's Bay. On 2 May 1670 the "Governor and Company of Adventurers of England trading into Hudson's Bay"

received Royal sanction and one month later, Radisson and the newly appointed North American governor, Charles Bayly, sailed on the Wivenhoe. Their firm intention was to establish a trade structure on the west coast of the Bay. They first hoped to build a small post on the Nelson River and allegedly claimed the region on behalf of King Charles, "and in tocken thereof, nayled up the Kings Armes in Brasse on a Small Tree."[7] But they remained no longer than one evening, thereby leaving the Nelson River open for future occupations.[8]

The next twelve years in the history of bayshore occupations was a story of see-sawing loyalties and alternating victories and defeats between the British and the French whose interest in the Bay had been rekindled. During the summer of 1682 a New England group led by Benjamin Gillam settled twenty-six miles up Nelson River on "Bachelor's" or "Gillam" Island.[9] Meanwhile Radisson and Groseilliers, now in the service of the French king, settled ten miles up the Hayes River on its south bank.[10] Soon the Hudson's Bay Company's own vessel, the Rupert, under the command of Bejamin Gillam's father, Zachariah, and carrying John Bridgar, the prospective governor of the Nelson River establishment, attempted to enter Nelson River, but "was driven off shore, by ice on 21st October and was lost at sea with Zachariah Gillam and about nine of her crew."[11] The survivors were forced to depend on assistance from their enemies the French.

Meanwhile Radisson and Groseilliers were able to maintain their foothold in the area by destroying the New Englander's posts. In their confidence they sailed for France in 1683 leaving Groseillier's son, Jean Baptiste Chouart, with less than ten men, to maintain their control of the coast. Soon after, a Hudson's Bay Company vessel, commanded by John Abraham, arrived in the Nelson River and its crew subsequently established a post whose location has not been accurately pin-pointed.[12] A year later Abraham was placed "in charge of the building of a new post, York Fort on the north shore of Hayes River, with George Geyer in immediate command."[13] For the next two years ascendancy in the area fluctuated between the French and English.

During the spring of 1686 Abraham, in company with Michael Grimington, sailed northward to the mouth of the Churchill and his report of the voyage proved instrumental in motivating the Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company to establish a settlement in the area:

> ....In February 1688 the Committee firmly resolved that it should be settled that year, with

> a good ship, an adequate cargo, and materials for white whale fishing. The Dering was then instructed to sail for Port Nelson, load building materials for Churchill there, and return to Nelson for the winter after unloading at the proposed post. The Colleton yacht was to accompany the Dering from Nelson to Churchill, and was to winter at Churchill...[14]

The Colleton arrived in 1689 and the crew began the construction of a fort which unfortunately burned to the ground in August of the same year. With some irony James Knight was prompted to comment almost thirty years later that, "the English had built one [a fort] wch they found so badd that After they had built it I believe they was so Discouraged that they sett it a fire to Run away by the light of it."[15]

One of the crew-members of the Colleton expedition was Henry Kelsey. Upon landing in the Churchill River area, Kelsey ventured inland on June 17, 1689, "to discover & Endeavor to bring/to a Commerce y^e^ northern Indians Inhabiting to y^e^/Northward of Churchill River..."[16] According to his own account, Kelsey began this journey on board the Hopewell shallop but only "20 leagues" from the mouth of the Churchill the vessel was stranded by ice. He undertook the rest of the uneventful journey by land, in the company of an Indian lad named Thomas Savage. The only excitement was provided by the sighting of musk-oxen which Kelsey described as "ill/shapen beast...their Horns not growing like other Beast/but Joyn together upon their forehead and so come down/ y^e^ side of their head...[with] hair is near a foot long..."[17] Kelsey's desire to establish a trading connection with the Northern Indians was never realized. Savage's inordinate fear of the northern tribes forced Kelsey to cut the journal short. Oddly the young Indian showed none of the same deference to Kelsey, calling him, "a fool...not sensable of y^e^ dangers." Thus, "he would go no further..."[18] On July 12, a disgruntled Kelsey turned back toward the Churchill encampment, only to find on his arrival, that the "house was Reduced to ashes & y^t^ most of y^e^ things/were burnt..."[19]

While Kelsey had been travelling through the northern regions, the Hudson's Bay Company had continued to vie with the French for control of the Bay. Still stinging from an overland attack of Chevalier de Troyes and the Sieur d'Iberville in 1686, and stimulated by King William's declaration of war against France in May 1689, the English re-took Forts Albany, Moose and Charles by 1693. For an instant the English found themselves in control of the entire Bay, but their

success was short-lived. D'Iberville swiftly counter-attacked, and captured Fort York in 1694.

Nicholas Jérémie was one of the men who accompanied D'Iberville on the expedition, to re-take Hudson's Bay in September, 1694. According to his account, D'Iverbille's contingent left Quebec on August 10 and arrived in the Hayes River toward the end of September. By this time the Fort had already been "re-designed and properly built by Geyer on the tongue of land which separated the mouth of the Hayes from the Nelson."[20] Jérémie's version of the battle indicates that the French "harassed" the fifty-three men of the English garrison from September 25th to October 4th (or 14th). Apparently Governor Walsh and his men were unable to withstand repeated "bombs" and "continual fire from their loop holes," and were thereby forced to surrender. D'Iberville entered the Fort on October 5th (or 15th).[21]

Jérémie described the fortress as having:

> ...four bastions, forming a square of thirty feet,in which was a large warehouse of two stories. The trading store was in one of these bastions, another served as a supply store, and the other two were used as guard houses to hold the garrison. The whole was built of wood. In line with the first palisade were two other bastions, in one of which the officers lodged, the other serving as a kitchen and forge for the garrison. Between these two bastions was a kind of half moon space in which were eight cannon, throwing an eight pound ball, which commanded the river side. Below this half moon space was a platform, at the level of the water, which held six pieces of heavy cannon. No cannon was mounted on the side of the wood [rear]; all the cannon and swivel guns were on the bastions. There were altogether in the fort, which had only two palisades of upright logs, thirty two cannon and fourteen swivel guns.[22]

As if to imprint the permanence of the French presence on the region, D'Iberville then renamed the fort to Fort Bourbon and the Hayes River became known as the St. Teresa River.

In 1696, however, two Company vessels accompanied by two British men-of-war, sailed into Nelson River and re-captured Fort York (Bourbon). But this occupation was ephemeral as all the others. By 1697 the Fort had been restored to French hands by the ubiquitous D'Iberville. Henry Kelsey's observation of the recapture, as recorded in the

journal of 1697, indicates that the English had lost confidence in their capability to defend the fort. Kelsey noted that, "finding such great force/as nine hundred men & ye ill tidings of our own ships/concluded could not keep it & so agreed to ye articles aforsign'd by monseir...& ye french/took possession of ye fort," ending what he further described as a "Tedious winter and a tragical Journal ...."[23] This capture also ended English claims to paramountcy in the Bay and, until the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, the post on the Nelson remained under French control.[24]

During the French occupation of York, or Bourbon, another post was established on the south side of Hayes River "two leagues" from the fort at a place, "where the river is first intersected by islands."[25] Jérémie reported that a large store-room was built alongside this fort to be used "as a retreat in case of a hostile attack." It appears that by 1771 the French occupied both sides of the Hayes River, with Fort Bourbon on the north bank and Fort Phelipeaux on the south, thereby effectively safeguarding the entrance to that river.[26]

According to Jérémie's account of his twenty years at Fort Bourbon (York Factory) (1694-1714) it is apparent that the French adapted well to the exigencies of the northern environment. The men hunted geese, duck, partridges, and hares in the spring, and when they were busy with trade matters they employed natives to provision the forts, "giving them a pound of powder and four pounds of lead for twenty ducks or brant...."[27] In one year, (Probably 1709-10)[28] when a garrison, under the command of Jean Leger de la Grange, wintered at Fort Bourbon, Jérémie observed that: "When spring had come, we made out that eighty men whom we numbered; garrison and company, had eaten 90,000 partridges and 25,000 hares."[29] Later in the season, the men were employed in hunting caribou whose numbers were "almost countless," and experimented with a fishery which caught "pike, trout,carp and...whitefish," the latter being described as unquestionably the best fish in all the world."[30] They also attempted to cultivate a garden but the short growing season restricted its produce to lettuce, cabbage and small herbs which were used to make soup. In the fall, all provisions were packed and frozen for winter use. Jérémie concluded by acknowledging that "this country, although it has a bad climate, gives us a good living when Europe helps us out with bread and wine."[31]

Jérémie failed to record the French trade with the native population except to comment that they had been supplied by France with a realistic quantity of trading goods, a

very profitable trade would have resulted because of Bourbon's advantageous location. What goods they did have were completely spent by 1709, and they were forced to wait another four years before the arrival of a supply ship. This drought in trade goods does, however, serve to indicate the extent to which the local Indian population had become dependent on the European intruders as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century. Jérémie indicates that the Indians had been in a "bad way" during this interim period as a direct result of the lack of trade goods.

> ...many of them [the natives] died of hunger, for they had lost their skill with the bow since Europeans had supplied them with fire-arms. They have no other resource to live on except the game they kill with guns, for they know nothing about cultivating the land and raising vegetables. Always wanderers they never stay a week in the same place. When at the point of starvation, the father and mother kill their children and eat them, and then the stronger of the two eats the other.[32]

Whether or not Jérémie's description of cannibalism is factual, his observations clearly demonstrate that the process of native assimilation and the dependency created by European materialism was well underway in the Nelson-Hayes area long before the Hudson's Bay Company assumed final control of the region.

Negotiations for a peace settlement to the War of Spanish Succession had not begun until 1709. At this point, France was experiencing export difficulties and the millinary industry was facing a depression. Consequently, unsaleable furs had been "piled up in warehouses in putrefying heaps...."[33] The lack of communication, resulting from a loss in shipping to Fort Bourbon, produced a drastic decrease in fur returns. By 1713, as peace negotiations came to a close, the French no longer believed that Bourbon was the "coveted prize it had [been] in Iberville's day."[34] They therefore agreed to acknowledge the return of English rights to Hudson's Bay as part of the Treaty of Utrecht. In 1714 Governor James Knight, on behalf of the Hudson's Bay Company, arrived in Hayes River to take over the fort from the French, prompting Jérémie to later remark that Fort Bourbon (now York Factory), ...were it still a French possession...[it] would be one of the best [Forts] in America, even if a very small amount were spent on it.[35]

Upon their arrival at York Factory on 7 Spetember 1714,

Governor Knight and Deputy-Minister Henry Kelsey were faced with immediate difficulties. Knight realized the buildings were uninhabitable and in a letter to Richard Stanton, Chief at Albany, he described the situation thus:

> ...I found a most miferable place, all y^{e} Factory Run to Ruin, the House & Covering all rotten & fallen in, So that there is not a place fitt for Man nor Goods to go in, but wt: was ready to fall on our heads, & so Leaky that I found the best place to lay our Goods in was without doors.[36]

This problem was compounded by shortages in fuel and food made more serious by the lateness of the season. Structural improvement therefore had to be postponed until the next spring. The delay in construction made life at York Factory, quite miserable during the winter of 1714-15. Knight's recollection of that winter was as follows:

> ...When I first came into it wee had nothing but a Little place not fitt to keep Hoggs...Goods all lying without doors in Tents not fitt to preferve them...I found it so badd no tongues is able to Exprefs it for every one of the Houfes were worse than Dogg kennells all Rotten & Tumbling in.[37]

In reference to his own dwelling, Knight claimed that a cow-house at the "Bottom of the Bay" was far better accommodation, his own being, "so black and dark, cold and wet withal, [with] nothing to make it better but heaping up earth about it to make it warm."[38]

Knight's plan to build new quarters after spring break-up in 1715 was suspended because of the disastrous flooding of York Factory during the spring thaw. On May 7 the Hayes River began to rise and Knight reported that, "y^{e} Waters forc'd y^{e} River to break up before we had any Thaw." In a few hours the ice and water had already crowded past the pallisades and began to enter the buildings within the Fort:

> ...there came such a prodigious Quantity of water as Raif'd it above Six Fathom, so that we had above two foot water in the upper Story, & it was up to the brest work of all the Flankers & within 5 foot & ½ of the topp of the Warehouse, & y^{e} Ice carried away the S:W Flanker, borke it all to pieces & tore all the Pallisadoes to the Ground & one Side of the House as I Live in...Wee were all forc'd to leave the Factory & betake our Selves to the Woods & gett one [on] trees...

> Continued up for Six Days, wee looking every minute when y^{e} Factory would be tore to pieces: The Ice $\frac{n}{y}$ Lay heap'd & Crowded at least 20 foot higher the Factory...[39]

In the aftermath of the floor Knight and his men found their home full of ice, with mud knee deep in all the buildings. For the next twenty days when the water finally subsided, the weather continued cold bringing snow and sleet. Repair work could only be carried out under the most adverse conditions.

Damage to the Fort was immense. Although most of the Company's goods had been stored in the upper levels of the buildings,[40] the deluge had destroyed a considerable number of the goods, precluded any possibility of planting a vegetable garden, and drowned all of the domestic animals. It caused the river bank both above and below the Fort to be "rubed away with ice near 20 Foot" and left "3 Great Cakes of Ice" near the pallisades which were reportedly thirty feet higher than the top of Knight's house.[41] Finding that repairs were to be of such a large scale, the Governor decided to begin construction of a new Fort approximately one-half mile upstream.

The spring flood did not mark the end of the difficulties experienced by York Factory in 1715, for the Company Ship, carrying provisions and trade goods for the upcoming season failed to arrive. Commanded by Joseph Davies, the ship had apparently arrived close enough to shore to see the beacon light but through the "ignorance or cowardice of her captain [had]...failed to locate the port and had returned with her cargo to England."[42] This caused a severe crisis at the Fort. Knight would have no trade goods to exchange with the Indians during the approaching season. On September 10th he made the following observation in his journal,

> ...haveing no news of a Ship makes mee...dread the dismall consequence of it, our powder being all spent but 10 barrells so that the Natives that comes next year to trade will be all disappointed after they have spent the whole Summer in coming down...besides many Indians (will be) starved for want of powder....[43]

The Indian dependency on European trade goods, and the Company's inability to provide these goods, were to have dire

consequences for York Factory.

Assiniboine tribesmen who arrived at the Fort were turned away, disappointed and disillusioned with the English over the lack of trade. Others decided to winter at the Fort, refusing to return to their lands without goods. On June 14th, a tribe of "Mountain Indians" who had "not come to trade for 15 or 16 years," arrived only to be ordered away by Governor Knight.[44] Frustration was evident on both sides. The Indians were exasperated and the Company men became uneasy, fearing an Indian attack. By July 1716, the situation had worsened. Many of the natives were starving, and Knight, "could not even take up his nets from the river for fear of inflaming the hungry Indians."[45] Incredibly, the Company Ship was again late and trouble intensified at the Fort. Indian attacked Indian and the Company employees enclosed themselves within their newly completed stockade. Finally, on September 3rd the ship arrived and not a moment too soon for, as Knight observed, the Indians "would have been Starv'd and forced to Eat another."[46]

With order restored, Governor Knight turned his attention northward. Believing it to be in the Company's interest to found a settlement at or near the Churchill River, he hoped to draw the "Northern Indians" (Chipewyans), the Yellow Knives (Copper Indians), the Slaves, the Dogribs, and the Eskimos into trade. This would leave York Factory with jurisdiction over the "Home-Guards" (Crees) and the Assiniboines. By establishing a peaceful alliance among all these tribes, the Company could increase its fur trade returns. Churchill would have to restrict its trade to the northern tribes in order to, "give them the feeling of permanency and stability which no system of trading cruises from York Fort could give, and without which they would not turn seriously to fur hunting."[47] Hudson Bay historian, E.E. Rich has suggested that the Churchill establishment had three main prospects for the Hudson's Bay Company; first, it could withdraw superfluous trade from York Factory and "leave the latter free to compete with the French in the lands of the Saskatchewan, Moose, and Albany rivers"; second, it could act as the point of departure for northern discovery and seriously undertake a whale fishery; and finally, it could open the possibility of "access to great mineral wealth."[48]

Perhaps conscious of these advantages, Knight gave orders to William Stuart to journey Northward on a reconnaisance venture in the company of Thanadethur, the "Slave Woman."[49] A captive of a Cree raiding party which had fallen on the Chipewyans in the spring of 1713, Slave Woman, along with another female prisoner, had escaped from the Crees in the fall of 1714. It had been their goal to return north to their people before the onset of winter. Un-

fortunately, the Slave Woman's companion died in the attempt and she had been forced to travel alone. Late in November she, "fell upon the tracks of a party of Knight's men who were tenting at Ten Shilling Creek,"[50] and was eventuallly brought to York Factory where she immediately impressed Knight by her "forceful and intelligent character."[51] Her knowledge of both Cree and Chipewyan, as well as her familiarity with the country Knight was anxious to explore, prompted him to engage her services as both an interpreter and guide for the Churchill River trek.

William Stuart received his orders to enter peaceful negotiations with the Northern Indians on the 27th of June, 1715. Knight cautioned him to "take care that none of the Indians abufe or Mifsuse the Slave Woman," and while on the trip he was to urge her to "Acquaint her Country people that wee fhall Settle a factory at Churchill River next fall & that wee will trade wth them for Beavor Martin fox Quaquihatch Wolf Bear Otter Catt Moose & Buffalo Skins & Yellow Mettle."[52] A large party of Crees from York Factory were also persuaded to accompany Stuart and the Slave Woman in order to demonstrate their willingness to make peace with the Chipewyans.

The trip, however, was plagued by misfortune. By the new year many of the Crees had deserted following a "bitterly hard winter in the Barrens...distressed with sickness and near to death from starvation...."[53] Those who remained with Stuart refused to go any further, because they feared a possible confrontation with the Chipewyans. At one point the Slave Woman chose to venture out on her own and after ten days she returned with approximately 160 Indian men. As Stuart observed:

> ...the woman had made herself so hoarse with her perpetual talking to her country men in perswadin them to come with her that Shee could hardly Speak...

As forceful a personality did she possess that she kept the Cree Indians in "Awe" and made the Chipewyans "Stand in fear of her...and forced them to ye peace."[54] In effect, it was the Slave Woman who was able to introduce the Company to a trade further north of York Factory, guaranteeing a clientele for the future establishment at Churchill River.

The construction of the Churchill River post was begun in the spring of 1717 on a site that had been chosen by an advance party's decision that the most suitable location for the post would be on the north shore of the river,[55] and, on July 14th, Knight arrived to supervise the construction.

His description of the initial work hints at the dilemma which he faced:

> ...I burnt & Cleard a place where I Design the ffactory for to Stand, w^{ch} I believe to be the very place where Cap^{t} Monk built upon when he Wintred here, by the brass Gun & the Square peices of Cast Iron as wee have found thare...The place is the best in this River both for Landing of Goods & the house Standing, but here is no Good place at all.[56]

More emphatically Knight continued his lament: "Wee have a Misserable Poor place of it; York Fort is badd but this is Tenn times worse...for here is neither fish, Fowl nor Venison."[57] Nevertheless the promise of lucrative links with the north superceded the discomfort.

Supplies for the new post arrived late in the season. In the meantime, the most difficult problem for the men was procuring timber for the actual construction. Timber had to be rafted from ten or twelve miles upstream, a trip which necessitated frequent shoulder carriages. Construction was then started on the flankers before building the dwellings within, Knight's rationale for this arrangement was to provide the work encampment with a capability that "upon all Occasions wee shall be in a Capacity of Defending our Selves in our Work."[58] By September, the men had progressed to "Laying the floor of the Tradeing Room in y^{e} Upper Storey," had dug a cellar and begun building a Warehouse.[59]

As construction progressed through the spring and summer of 1718, Knight took the opportunity to visit England, leaving Richard Staunton, his Deputy, in charge. While in London Knight requested that the Governor and Committee officially name the new fort. Consequently, in 1719, "they instructed Richard Staunton, now Chief at Churchill River, 'for the future to Call in Prince of Wales Fort.'"[60]

The status of Prince of Wales's Fort (PWF) continued to grow as the Company regularized its trading expeditions by "sloop" to the north of Churchill River. Success at PWF provoked a jealousy at York Factory resulting in a state of rivalry between the two posts which would at last, with varying degrees of intensity, for the next century. This rivalry was most evident in the correspondence to London and at times, it assumed a competitiveness at a very personal level. During the summer of 1723, Richard Norton and Thomas Bird, who were jointly in charge of PWF, reported to London that trade at the post had increased a substantial "two-thirds more than last year," and that they were optimistic about

annually increasing the trade in small furs from the Northern Indians.[61] On the other hand, Thomas McCliesh (Macklish), Chief at York Factory, in his letter to the Committee, written only twenty days later, offered a contrary point of view:

> ...my opinion of the trade at Churchill will never answer the charge of sending a ship out of England, and the keeping so many men there, by reason most of the fur trade is only a robbing of this place; and put all the marten Indians and cat Indians, besides many other nations, so much talked of by Captain Knight and his hanger-on, does not exceed two hundred families.[62]

The Committee, however, was evidently more impressed with increased trade returns than personal opinions, and by 1725 PWF began to receive shipments of trade goods from London independent of York Factory. It was the Committee's belief that "the trade which developed at Churchill was considered to be trade won from the French."[63] Therefore, rather than permit York Factory to dictate Company policy towards PWF, the Committee provided the latter with an equal and independent status.

By 1729 the cannons of war once again threatened to disrupt the peaceful commerce of the Bay. Anticipating the outbreak of hostilities with France, the Company directed all Posts along the Bay to maintain proper defence at all times. Thomas Macklish heeded the Company's warning and reported that York Factory was "in a good posture of defence to keep the Natives under due obedience, or to keep us from any Afsault of an enemy...."[64] It would appear, however, that London did not share Macklish's optimism regarding the defensibility of Fort York and rumblings began to be heard over the possibility of constructing a new post with greater facilities.

At a Company sub-committee meeting on the 18th March 1730, it was decided that a new Fort should be erected on the Churchill River following a plan drawn by Captain Christopher Middleton, a Company sailor who had familiarized himself with the area. The plans indicated that the new fort should be built at "Eskimay Point" at the river mouth since this was the "most proper and convenient Place...for y^{e} advantage of the Comp:^{ies} Trade as well as Defence:...."[65] Orders were sent to Chief Factor Richard Norton requesting that he prepare an indent for utensils and stores necessary for the construction of the new fort. Norton's indent came before a sub-committee gathering on 1 April at which time it

was decided that twenty-four men, including tradesmen and labourers were to be sent out to Churchill River that summer.[66] The London Committee directed Governor Macklish at York Factory to provide PWF with "all Afsistance" in the actual construction and to maintain close personal contact. Similarly, Norton was advised that reciprocal co-operation would be expected of PWF: "It is Our order that a mutual Correspondence be maintain'd between each Factory and that you Supply each other with necefsaries when ever there is and Absolute occasion for so doing....".[67]

The construction of Prince of Wales's Fort II was an enormous undertaking. It was built of stone and finally consisted of four bastiens interconnected by curtains "along which ran boarded runways for guns, and a five-foot parapet pierced for gunports"[68] with forty-two mounted cannons.[69] Although it possessed the structural facilities needed for defence, PWF never held a garrison large enough to man these guns. How then could the Company have justified building such a massive fortress? A.S. Morton has provided the most reasonable explanation in A History of the Canadian West by suggesting the fort was built not to defend Churchill harbour against French attack, but rather to protect all the Company's possessions in the Hudson Bay. Thus:

> The plan must have had to do with the skips taking refuge in the commodious harbour under the shelter of the fortifications. In that case their crews would go to manning the fort. During the war [of Austrian Succession], 1744-48, the ships were required to sail in consort to the latitide of Churchill. In case of meeting the enemy in overpowering numbers they could find safety in the Churchill River, the crews man the fort and present an impregnable front to the foe.[70]

But despite this increbible preparation and attention to strategic detail, when a French naval expedition finally attacked in 1782, the "impregnable" fort had the misfortune to fall without firing a single shot.

While construction was still underway at PWF, in 1741 plans for structural improvements at York Factory were also being considered by the Committee in London. It was suggested to Thomas White, James Isham's successor as Chief Factor, that a new factory be built on the same site, ninety feet swuare with a double row of pallisades further surrounded by the existing moat. Further, the foundations of the old bastiens were to remain and "the Center of the pres-

sent Warehouse and Building [were to] be the Center of the new Factory."[71] White was quite willing to pursue the instructions concerning the building of a new factory but disagreed with the Committee over the matter of location. An inspection of the grounds led White to believe that because the "ground there being so very loofe occafiond; by yᵉ Moate," the Fort should be constructed about 200 yards "lower downe."[72] Exactly one year later, however, White capitulated and decided the fort would be rebuilt on the old spot as first proposed by the Committee.[73]

Reconstruction began during the summer of 1742. Each flanker was successively pulled down and re-built by moving "in from our old foundation 10 foot."[74] The next season the foundations of two bastions were laid along with the "sheds Contingent to them."[75] In 1745 Joseph Robson, a stone mason who had come from England to assist at Prince of Wales, arrived at York Factory. He described the fort as being "above high-water-mark, about eighty yards from Hayes's-river, and four miles from the fea [sea]."[76] After inspecting the work that White had supervised, Robson offered the following observations and criticisms:

> It is built with logs of white fir eight or nine inches fquare...In the fummer the water beats between the logs, keeping the timber continually damp; and in the winter the white froft gets through which being thawed by the heat of the ftoves, has the fame effect: fo that... the foundation and fuperfrusture rots fo faft, that in twenty-five or thirty years the whole fort muft be rebuilt with frefh timber, which with the great quantity ufed for firing, will occafion a fcarcity there in a few years.[77]

Of course Robson's criticisms were somewhat less than welcome. Yet, his predictions were quite accurate. By 1763 Chief Factor Ferdinand Jacobs lamented that the floor was decaying because it had been "very badly Put together at First." Timber was indeed lacking and what the employees were able to bring to the Fort was "Such bad Stuff that there was no Useing it."[78]

Thirteen years later Humphrey Martin described the condition of the buildings to be even worse. With some bitterness he reported to the Committee in London:

> The Magazine must be speedily rebuilt, The Platforms abreast the Fort are entirely rotten, Many dangerous Chasms have been made by the Spring

> Thaws, the outward North Stockades almost falling down, The Mens Cook Room and Smiths Shop much gone to decay, The Floor of the North Flanker and the lining of the Celler in ruins, and the Window Shutters rotten as they hang....[79]

House carpenters were entirely lacking at York, and those that were sent out were inexperienced or, according to the Chief Factor, unable to do anything worthy of notice. The structural difficulties of the fort were to continue unabated and Robson's predictions were all verified.

The construction of PWF II and the re-construction of York Factory was labour in vain for when finally challenged by the French in 1782 both forts proved to be impotent and provided no resistance. Jean Francois Galaup, Compte de la Perouse sailed into Hudson's Bay on August 3rd with three war vessels, the seventy-four gun Sceptre, and the Astrée and Engageante, each with thirty-six guns.[80] La Perouse's mission was to re-establish French trade in Hudson's Bay, confident that "with the Americans virtually independent the goods could [thereafter] be sold at Boston or Philadelphia."[81] On the 8th of August Perouse sighed Prince of Wales's Fort and anchored "within a league and a half of it, sounding all the way."[82] La Perouse later stated that the fort originally looked as if it was "in a condition to make a vigorous defence" but when his detachment moved "within cannon shot" they found that the Fort was not prepared to show any resistance. "They made no hesitation; the gates were opened; and the governor and garrison surrendered at discretion."[83] Smauel Hearne, then Governor of Churchill, was taken prisoner and the fort itself received new structural damage that it could ill sustain. La Perouse having "spiked the cannon and burned the gun carriages, undermined the walls and blew great breaches in the, and set fire to the fort in five different places."[84] On the 11th the French set sail for York Factory.

La Perouse decided that York Factory should be attacked from the rear by way of Nelson River. "I knew that all the means of defence were on Haye River; and... [that] this river is also full of sand banks...[and] our boats might remain stranded within cannon shot...I therefore [decided] ...all the batteries on Haye River, would be taken in reverse, and consequently become useless."[85] By the 24th of August Humphrey Martin surrendered York Factory to the enemy and accepted terms of capitulation which would guarantee their lives and property. The fort was set on fire and the ships

set sail for France the next day. As both a warrior and a gentleman La Perouse was later to report:

> ...I took care, in burning Fort York, to save a considerable magazine, in a place remote from the fire, and in which I caused to be deposited provisions, powder, shot, firelocks, and a certain quantity of European merchandise...in order that some English, whom I knew had taken refuge in the woods, should they return to their old place of residence, find in that magazine wherewithal to provide for their subsistence, until England might be informed of their situation...[86]

Although this small supply may have salvaged the winter for the English traders once they emerged from the woods, it could not possibly safeguard the needs of the native population dependent as they were on either York Factory or PWF. Therefore, during the next year, while both sites lay idle, the Indian people suffered famine and disease that would prove ruinous to the Company's trade along the Bay for the years to come.

Humphrey Martin and Samuel Hearne returned to their respective posts in 1783. At York Factory Martin found about thirty Indians living among the ruins and he immediately dispatched a number of them to Fort Severn in order to alert that post of the Ship's arrival.[87] Hearne's initial report from PWF indicated that the Indians had completely deserted the area, having "not seen the least appearance of an Indian having been here since last Summer."[88] The lack of Indian assistance in making snowshoes or providing the Company employee with shoe leather for PWF was severly felt and it became "impofsible to travel in the Winter either to hunt Partridges, catch Fish, or on any other necefsary occasions."[89] The men at Churchill, then, were without native assistance and unlike York Factory, had to fend for themselves throughout the winter of 1783.

Reconstruction at York Factory proceeded on exactly the same site as before, whereas PWF was re-located five miles upstream from the disgraced stone fort. As expected, the latter found re-building more difficult although York was not completely immune from problems. According to Humphrey Martin, the servants at York were totally inept in their work, building was slow, and its product of poor construction. He described the situation in a letter to Prince of Wales's Fort:

> ...Not aboard for the Partitions below Stairs

> not a Window Shutter nor aboard for my bed place, and tho' we have been continually sawing for it and at work on it, not half finished. We got the quartering filled up with Bricks and morter, which froze before we could get it dried so that litterally we live in a House of Ice...I lye in a Cott close to the Chimney or I should be to Death. The Chimney smoaks so badly I have almost lost my eyes voice and lungs...I never knew such a set (considering our Numbers) of unhandy, Ignorant, Stupid fellows in my life....[90]

At Churchill River, where the morale should have been lower, Hearne was quite satisfied with his employees, who "know their duty,"[91] although he was distressed by the difficulty of obtaining building materials. The fort was actually to be erected on the exact spot where the old wooden fort had once stood. By September of 1783 construction was well underway and Hearne was forced to indent for timber from England because he insisted that none "fit for that use..." be procured near the post, now referred to as Fort Churchill.[92] The Committee rejected his request, however, indicating that such an indent was far too extravagant, and Hearne gave vent to his disappointment.

> ...I [Hearne] cofefs it was no small Disappointment in not Receiveing the timber, and I apprehend the price at this time would have been trifleing... 54 years [since the construction of PWF II] has made such an alteration in the Woods at this Place, that where Mefs:rs Rich:d Norton, Jam.s Isham, & Rob.t Pilgram could not finde Timber to Build a house, we can at present, scarce; finde fewil to cook our victuals, and keep us from freezeing dureing the Winter.[93]

London's lack of assistance appears to have re-kindled the jealousy between Churchill River and York Factory which served only to augment the old rivalry between the two posts.

Ferdinand Jacobs, Chief Factor at Churchill in 1758, had complained to the Committee in London that James Isham at York Fort was encouraging Indians who generally traded at Churchill, to come down to his post. Isham denied the charge and the Committee reprimanded Jacobs for not displaying as much ambition in pursuading inland tribes to come to trade: "Mr. Isham (who strongly denies encouraging any of your Ind^{s} to come to York Fort) has found the Benefit to his Trade by sending up some of our Servants into the Country

amongst the Inland Indians whom they have brought down to the Factory in great Numbers, and you have as fair an Opportunity in pursuing the same method...."[94] York Factory therefore continued to expand its trade unconcerned with the rising tide of resentment on the Churchill. After rebuilding of the posts following the French disaster of 1782 Hearne felt that London was discriminating against Churchill in favour of York. For example, in his correspondence with London in 1785, he suggested, "Your Honors must we think be entirely unacquainted with our present situation, to say we was, or now are, in an exact or similar situation to those that went to Settle York Factory."[95] Such remonstrances against York and the counter-attacks which resulted were to continue until the turn of the century.

During the 1790s the dispute between York Factory and Churchill Factory intensified, and came to be waged on quite a personal level. Thomas Stayner, Chief Factor, of Churchill, and Joseph Colen, Chief Factor of York, evidently refused to negotiate their differences and by 1793 had ceased to communicate with each other altogether.[96] The London Committee attempted to act as a mediator in this profitless dispute, alternately cautioning one while rebuking the other. In 1794 the Committee suggested that hereafter Churchill should build its own canoes for inland travel rather than relying of York Factory for this service. Apparently realizing the futility of a negotiated peace between the forts, the Company gave Colen "exprefs Orders...to attempt nothing towards Churchill River, that can be done by [Churchill using] ... a shorter Track." The Committee added: "We shall always discountenance the Factories interfering with each other."[97] But Stayner was only partially pleased with the Committee's orders. Although he assured them that "this is all we require of Mr. Colen," Stayner actually wanted more a specific quarantee that York's expansion would not interfere with Churchill's trade.

The solution lay with York's outposts on the Nelson River. According to Stayner, the dispute could not end unless Colen's "Houses up Nelson River will be laid aside, as they have from the first of their being settled accumulated Furs for YF [York Fort] at the expense of the decrease of Trade at Churchill."[98] But the London Committee did not feel that compliance with such a request was necessary, and the problem of the maverick posts on the Nelson remained unresolved.

During the fall of 1790 York Factory had established a trading settlement at a place called the "Nestoowyans" on the Nelson River approximately "15 days Journey" from York.[99] Its purpose was to attract the Indians of the "Athapascow country" and to provide competition for the Canadian

traders who were making steady inroads into areas formerly monopolized by the Hudson's Bay Company. William Sinclair was placed in charge of the Nestoowyans and for the benefit of Stayner at Churchill he reportedly "saw no Indians.... [who] were in habits of visiting [Churchill] settlement." Despite this limitation, according to Colen, he was able to procure a "Valuable trade with little expense which would have been trade by the Canadians had he not settled there."[100] Stayner was unsympathetic with this view and insisted that the establishment had actually "seduced" the Indians from Churchill and had permitted Indians who were indebted to that Fort to obtain further credit on goods at York Factory.

Bored with the constant haggling and irritated by the damage it was causing in the trade statistics, the Committee in London suggested that Churchill put an end to its remonstrances and concentrate more on its trade functions:

> Every Factory or Settlement must rise or fall by its own merits & we desire you will keep this general principle in View Viz^t: That it is by an encreasing Trade only, from which any of our Servants can expect encouragement.[101]

Whereas Churchill's trade had declined, York's continued to increase and the Committee was firmly convinced that this was due solely to the latter's efficiency in business. Further, they suggested that perhaps Churchill was venturing too much to the Southwest instead of concentrating on the Northern trade. In a scathing letter to Stayner they outlined their position thus:

> ...We do not send our Servants to act in opposition to each other, but from the Nature of our Trade & the Bounties allowed on MB^r all our Traders will, if they be industrious accumulate as much property as they can...& which can only be done but by increasing the returns to the Company. It is appears to us that you are falling down in your trading incursions too much to the SW instead of keeping to the N by which means you get into the track of the York Traders & consequently interfere with each other. As to any unfair means being used so as to circumvent you in your Trade We have no conception of it.[102]

According to this letter the Committee had clearly sided with York, but by the following year Stayner had somehow managed

to change the Committee's mind. In the process he had also charged York with corruption in its business affairs but a meeting between Stayner and Colen in September 1796 brought about an unenthusiastic reconciliation between the two factories. Colen stated bitterly in his letter to London, that,

> Our feelings are much hurt in finding we have lofs the Confidence of our Employers; altho' the Disgrace is so pointedly at York We have the pleasing consolation of looking back without accusing ourselves of any Misconduct of peculation or embezzling the Honble Co's property.[103]

The reason for this ultimate reconciliation of the two forts remains a mystery, but it appears to have brought the outright hostility between the posts to an end.

Churchill officially obtained jurisdiction over trade in the Athapascow country on the condition that under Stayner's management the proceeds from that region were never to fall short of their usual quantity. In their final letter to Stayner, which was also a final plea to be done with the petty jealousies that had done enough damage to the Company's trading position, the Committee stated:

> ...[We hope] that between the claims of Churchill & York to this Trade, we may be the incapacity of one & the relinquishing of it by the other, [not] at length lose the whole. On this ground we are under disagreeable apprehensions lest this Scheme of Mr. Stayner's should fail...[104]

It was clearly time to put differences aside and to concentrate every effort on an effective trading pattern in order to win the confidence of their Indian allies and to provide an efficient competition for the Canadian traders who had moved back into the North-West.

Aside from his personal dispute with Stayner, Joseph Colen had contributed substantially to the historical development of York Factory. Upon accepting his appointment as Chief Factor he had assured the Committee in London that one of his major undertakings would be the construction of a new Fort to replace the existing structure which had suffered severe damages during the spring break-up of 1785. Colen had planned to re-build on the same site but changed his mind when in 1787 water from the Hayes River rose 32½ feet and severly damaged the fort once again.[105] In the spring of 1788 the foundations were laid at a loca-

tion further upstream at the present site of York Factory which Colen believed would be "free from Danger on the breaking up of the River Ice and when compleated will be convenient and secure..."[106] Actual building of York Factory III, which Colen referred to as "New York," proceeded very slowly and its poor construction was to plague its future inhabitants.

Hudson's Bay Company policy during the first half of the eighteenth century centered on a quiescent trade at its bayside posts: Albany, Moose, York, Churchill, Severn, Eastmain, and Rupert River. Under the Governorship of Sir Bibye Lake, between 1712 and 1743, the Company resisted the temptation to establish posts further inland and instead, "relied on the quantity, price and certainty of its trade goods at the Bayside posts to bring down the Indians from the interior in the summer."[107] Cree and Assiniboine Indians undertook the role of middlemen between the Company and the more distant tribes of the western regions. Without serious competition from New England or New France this procedure became somewhat institutionalized and inland penetration seemed remote. This promoted Joseph Robson to comment in 1752 that: "The Company have for eighty years flept [slept] at the edge of a frozen fea; they have fhewn no curiofity to penetrate farther themfelves, and have exerted all their art and power to crufh that fpirit in others."[108] From this point on, such complacency on the part of the Company was slowly replaced by an awareness that unless a more aggressive policy was adopted French traders would overrun the western interior and effectively strangle the Company's trade network.

York Factory had complained of French competition as early as 1732. In a letter to London in that year, Thomas Macklish informed the Committee that French wood runners were establishing settlements at strategic locations along the main water arteries leading to the Bayside posts and forcing the Indians to trade with them. In his letter he stated:

> ...I expected att Leaft 60 Cannoes this Summer of those Indians that Borders near the French Settlement, att the Southermost End of the Great Lake, that Feeds this River Likewife Port Nelson River, whereas here came but 16 Cannoes, the Rest went to the French the first of this Summer, not for their being more kindly Ufed by the French but Intirely out of Fear, For Last September 3 Cannoes of the French Wood Runners after their Returne from Canady, went into the great Lake,

> to the moft Noted Places where the Indians Reforts, and what with threatning to Proclaime Warr against them Provided they Came to trade here, Likewife to Encourage their Common enemys, the Poetts to break the Peace with them made two years agoe....[109]

Further infiltration by French Canadian traders became inevitable and as a result, the Company readily felt the effects of decreasing trade returns. Nevertheless, it refused to consider permanently establishing posts inland and preferred to send men to winter with the Indians with the object of encouraging the latter to travel to the Bay posts with their furs in the spring.

The Company believed the advantages of a move inland were heavily outweighed by the problems of difficult transport and inexperienced or unwilling personnel. Yet such a policy was enigmatic: the Company lost revenue as trade decreased but refused to move inland because of the expense. Unknowingly it demonstrated the irony of its own policy in a despatch to Ferdinand Jacobs at York Factory in 1769. The Committee informed Jacobs that:

> We are very much alarmed at the surprizing Decrease in your Trade last year...We are very unwilling to have Our Trade continue to be interrupted in this manner...[However] We can by no means thing, at present at least of creating an Inland Eftablishment of 15 or 25 Men as you propofe since the Expences accruing thereby and the difficulties of conveying Goods might nearly amount to the Charge of a Principal Factory.[110]

Although the conclusion of the Seven Years' War had by this time effectively crippled France's Montreal-based fur trade, competition from the St. Lawrence had not been eradicated. A fresh infusion of capital and a reorganization of policy based on French experience, combined to provide new and more effective opposition for the Company in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The new "Laurentian" trading system was loosely organized, utilized British and American colonial capital, and later assumed the name of the "North West Company." It was essentially a"copartnership which underwent several reorganizations and changes of personnel, but for thirty years it represented a magnificent union of organization and enterprise."[111]

Known to Company personnel in the North-West as the Canadian or English Pedlars, the North West Company challenged the Bay Company's monopoly of the interior by tapping

the resources of the Bayside posts. This presented the London Committee with an immediate dilemma: "As the Continent of America is now wholly in the hands of the British Subjects it is not proper for us to make use of those measures which might otherwise be exerted against the Subjects of a Foreign Nation..."[112] Unwilling to act aggressively, or competitively against this encroachment, the Bayside posts' influence steadily weakened over the Indians. In 1774 Ferdinand Jacobs lamented:

> The Pedlars have been amongst the York Fort Trading Indians with 56 Large Canoes and carried of [off] the York Fort Trade, I have also been informed that 6 Large Canoes have been amongst the Churchill Trading Indians...[113]

This situation worsened for the Company. In 1778 York Factory sent only 7510 13/30 Made Beaver home to England,[114] a figure which had decreased from an annual average return of approximately 35,000 skins during the period 1731-1745.[115] Humphrey Martin reported that the Pedlars had:

> ...now taken pofsesion of the Bungee country, and some of them winter'd not ten days paddle from this [York] Fort; Peter Pangman and his brother have cut off more than one thousand made beaver from hence; Other traders are Settled, in the Sturgeon; the Pegs, ga, ma; the Swan River; Indians country, and Indeed almost every avenue that leads to York Fort through which traders must pafs....[116]

The situation at Churchill was the same. Whereas in 1755 Prince of Wales's Fort had boasted of a trade of "upwards of 13,000,"[117] by 1775 it reported only 7,375 1/6 made Beaver and only eleven canoes of Indian traders. Andrew Graham, Chief Factor, explained this decrease by curtly stating: "...such is the Influence of the Pedlars within us....".[118]

Until the coalition between the Hudson's Bay Company and the North West Company in 1821, and despite the anomalous directives issuing from London, both York Factory and Fort Churchill busily attempted to challenge the Pedlars on their own terms by sending servants inland to establish settlements such as Norway House, Cumberland House, Basquia (The Pas), and later the Swan River area. The Company further attempted to improve its transportation system by the introduction of the York Boat and the orgainzation of a supply network from Hudson's Bay into the interior. The pre-

Coalition period was further characterized by intense rivalry fluctuating trade returns, questionable business practices and a drain in fur-bearing animals caused by the vigorous competition.

In 1809 the London Committee underwent changes in personnel which "brought a new spirit and firmer objectives to the management of the Company's business."[119] A new addition to the Committee was Andrew Wedderburn (Colville), who in 1809 proposed that the Company adopt a "Retrenchment System" which advocated efficiency and economy with "a scheme of payment by results which, it was hoped, would make the Hudson's Bay men increase their efforts."[120] Administratively, the Company was to be divided into the Northern and Southern Departments. The former would contain the Districts of York, Churchill, Saskatchewan, and Winnipeg, while the latter was to be comprised of Albany, Moose, and Eastmain.[121] Following the Coalition, of course, the Company's territory was defined by three Departments: the Montreal, the Southern, and the Northern Department.[122] York Factory and Churchill were designated as separate districts under the Northern Department.

As early as 1815 the Company defined the York Factory district to include the posts at Severn, Trout Lake, Oxford House, Nelson River, and God's Lake. Its area of jurisdiction was as follows:

> ...along the Coast of Hudson's Bay in a South East direction as far as Cape Lookout or Trout River...in a northerly course as far as Churchill River...In a SW direction...into the interior as far as Pathapowenippu where it is bounded by the department of East Winnipeg...in a SE direction thro the interior, its limits are not defined but may be said to terminate that the waters of Wenusk River which fall into the Sea...[123]

The Churchill District held jurisdiction over the posts of Indian Lake, Deers Lake, and Fort Churchill (Old Churchill House), as well as periodically assuming responsibility for Nelson River.[124] Geographically the district in 1825 was bounded on the southeast and south by York Factory and the Nelson River, on the west by Grey Deers Lake, Isle a la Crosse, and Athabasca, and on the northwest by Great Slave Lake and the McKenzie River. According to Colin Robertson, a former Nor'Wester, and then Chief Factor of York Factory, the Churchill District formed a "Semicircle of an amazing circumference as remarkable for its extent as the Country it encloses is for its Sterility in Fur-Bearing Animals."[125] This statement proved only too accurate. In the late 1820s inland settlements tapped fur sources which formerly be-

belonged to Churchill, the "Home-Guard" Indians experienced particularly hard winters which affected their productivity, and the Eskimo trade became more irregular. George Simpson, Governor-in-Chief of Rupert's Land, noted the chronological deterioration of Churchill's importance in his annual reports to London:

> (1824) I am concerned to state that the Trade of this Department had not been so productive this season as of late years owing to a variety of causes, the principal of which were the unusual depth of Snow, severity of the winter and scarcity of the means of subsistence which confined the unfortunate natives to their encampments and checked their exertions... [126]

> (1826)...Churchill Fort of long standing celebrity has now dwindled away to the rank of a petty outpost of York Factory, with no other Establishment than a Junior Clerk and Four Men...The visits of the Esquimaux are so irregular that we cannot depend on them for the Oil Trade...[127]

> (1831)...[York Factory and Churchill]...are now under the same management, the latter being an Outpost from the former...In former days when dignified with the title of Factory Churchill was the Depôt of Nelsons river and Deer & Indian Lakes, and as the Honble Company were not then permanently Settled in the Chipewyan Lands it answered a good purpose in drawing many of that tribe with considerable quantities of valuable Furs;...[now] those Countries are fully established & supplied through other Channels, and Churchill is now merely required to Collect the few Skins which are hunted in the immediate vicinity by its own "Home Guards"....[128]

According to the Minutes of Council for the Northern Department, York Factory officially assumed jurisdiction over Churchill in 1826. York was ordered to supply Churchill with its requisite outfit of goods annually by sloop and the latter establishment was to support 30 servants under the direction of one clerk, Robert Harding.[129] Posts such as that at Indian Lake were abandoned under a conservation scheme which was initiated to replenish fur resources, and Churchill even began to dissuade its native population from hunting beaver: "A few years repose to that portion of the hunt must there also be productive of much ultimate benefit

to all concerned...."[130] Therefore, throughout the middle years of the nineteenth century, Churchill concentrated its fur trade on small animals like marten and then engaged in a whale oil trade with the Eskimos when market conditions made this venture profitable. By 1853 as free trade opposition was mounting in the interior districts such as the Swan River, Red River, and Saskatchewan, and Company policy was increasingly being directed towards the south and west, Churchill was left with only a postmaster to direct its affairs and it appeared that its significance to the Company had reached an unprecedented and unalterable low.

While Churchill decreased in importance following the Coalition, York Factory experienced eminent prosperity as the headquarters of the Northern Department of Rupert's Land. As the administrative centre, York was responsible for a number of labour intensive tasks including: the gathering of all fur returns from the districts in the North-West; repacking these returns for efficient shipment to London; preparing business accounts and an overall financial settlement; reviewing the state of the furs; skins, feathers, quills, and whale oil as received; arranging indents for future fiscal seasons; and, organizing outward brigades for their navigation back into the interior. York Factory also served as the port of entry for visitors, settlers, missionaries, scientific crews, explorers, military expeditions, and "gave to countless new servants a first impression of life in Rupert's Land - and a final memory to those who retired and went back to the British Isles."[131]

From 1822-1834 almost all the annual Councils of the Governor and Commissioned Gentlemen were held at York Factory. Under the Agreement known as the Deed Poll, traders in the new Hudson's Bay Company were given forty shares in the "clear gains" of the Company, and were hereafter, able to participate in the annual councils. These councils were held in order to determine the necessary Rules and Regulations "as may be considered expedient for conducting the business of the said Department" so that the Commissioned Gentlemen and Governor could "investigate the result of the trade of last year, and determine the Outfits and general arrangements for the trade of the current year...." [132] The minutes of these Councils were to establish the objectives of "the policies which directed the economic activities of territory under the control of the Hudson's Bay Company by charter, licence, lease or trade."[133]

The Minutes of Council of the Northern Department illustrate the orderliness with which the Hudson's Bay Company conducted its affairs in the Northwest. The Council discussed and decided many fundamental issues. These included the rotation of furlough, the appointments of men for the

coming year in all of the districts, salaries for all employees below the level of Commissioned Gentlemen (Chief Factors and Chief Traders), general trade agreements for the upcoming season, business projections for every aspect of the Company's commerce in furs, provisions, or horses and plans to regulate the trade with Indians and free traders. Trade within each district was carefully scrutinized in order to detect any deficiencies or irregularities, a system which encouraged careful deliberations of the solutions or strategies proposed therein.

The Committee in Council also considered additional topics such as:

> ...the adoption of measures for the transportation of goods, for regulating the size of outfits, for providing passages from one point to another, for forwarding letters...and [for] determining price lists for [evaluating] returns of trade.[134]

Each of these policies were important for the successful propagation of the fur trade and insured efficiency in business practices.

With all of its administrative duties as listed above, combined with the responsibility of sponsoring council sessions, it is obvious that York Factory assumed an extremely important position during the first half of the nineteenth century. Its influential position in business was reflected in structural improvements and additions. Letitia Hargrave, wife of Chief Factor James Hargrave, in her letters to England during the 1840s indicates that the Factory had developed quite an air of elegance. In a piece of correspondence to her mother in September, 1840, Letitia observed of York:

> ...It looks beautiful. The houses are painted pale yellow. The windows & some particular parts white. Some have green gauze mosquito curtains outside and altogether the effect is very good. Our house is a good size, 1 bedroom off each sitting room & men servants rooms off the kitchen a very large closet off the diningr^{m} I had nearly forgot my piano. It is a very fine one and the handsomest I ever saw.[135]

The buildings of the fort were laid out in a H shape with the guest house, the depot building or "Great House," and a summer mess house forming the center bar. "The legs of

the H were composed of four fur stores, and the arms contained the trading shop, provision store, clerk's house (Bachelor's Hall), and the house of the officer in charge."[136] Other buildings included: a boat shed, oil store, lumber house, ice house, powder magazine, cooper's shed, and smithy.[137]

The pattern of activity at York Factory was highly scheduled: each employee was responsible for carrying out specialized work according to the needs of the season. An analysis of these activities was prepared by James Hargrave in 1839 prior to his departure for England. This memorandum which served as a guide for his successor, Nicol Finlayson, illustrates the many and varied occupations of the people at York during a typical trading season (1839-40):

> (August)...landing and shipping cargoes - furnishing the requisite quantity of ballast...
> (September)...bringing into order all routine affairs connected with [the Ship's] presence ...The Indians usually arrive from the Goose Hunt about the end of this month when [they] are immediately paid off and sent away to their Wintering Grounds...From the departure of the ship while the Good weather continues, no regular Desk work is required...[all] being allowed to seek amusement & exercise in hunting and other recreations...
> ...The Boat builders, Coopers, Blacksmiths and are all used during the open season in forwarding such building and repairing labors and no regular work for the Trade is done in the Shops by them during this month...Towards the end of this month...the crop of Turnips reared in the Garden is taken up...put into open flour casks in the warmest & driest part of the Winter Kitchen cellar...
> (October)...[conclusion of] outdoor labors...people at the Estabt. receive their last supplies from the Sale Rooms for the winter ...[take Inventories]...various tradesmen...are set to work in their shops to manufacture Goods for the Trade...cutting firewood...The severe weather having set in, the winter desk duties of the Gentlemen also commence.
> (November)...Duty begins at daylight...the people having already Breakfasted and continued till dark with only one interval at an hour from Noon till 1 P.M. for Dinner...cold...[required] the cattle

> to be housed...Cattle & Pigs are slaughtered...cut up into pieces of a size suited to the Table... [Deer Hunters] are...actively employed in quest of animals...Partridges & Rabbits likewise now begin to be brought in...not only are supplies drawn from the "Home Guard" Indians on North River and the Eastern Coast, but a band of young Indian lads are usually retained as partridge Hunters, for whom a tent is pitched towards Point of Marsh...About the end of November the fish hawlers are expected to make their appearance from the Northward with a supply of the Mess...
> (December)...customary papers composing the Annual Winter Express from the Depot to the various Districts through[out] the North, are usually completed and despatched to Norway House... exchange their Inward Packet for Letters from Red River...As Christmas approaches...customary festivities of that season...[men] encouraged to make excursions on snow shoes hunting partridges...occasionally a Party at football is formed on the ice...
> (January)...hawling of Fish from the Cache to the Factory...[hawling of firewood using sledges]... hawling of [hay] from the estuary with Oxen begins... return packet...expected from [Norway House].
> (February)...cutting blocks of ice for the Ice House...packet from Moose Factory may...be expected.
> (March)...preparation for the Spring hunt...checking of the Store Inventory...
> (April)...commencing outdoor duties...the spring packing of Outfits also begins now.
> (May)...all the Band belonging to the Factory, can be sent off to the fishing lakes...ice may be expected to break up, upon the Factory River.
> (June)...[Oxford] Brigade may be expected... [Red River] freters [freighters] and the Saskn. Brigade usually [arrive ?], the Packet from Canada is received, & the Summer Campaign commences in full activity about the 1st of July - [138]

Hargrave's outline clearly indicates the precision and intensity of activity at York Factory at least until it was challenged by the Red River and American free traders and the revolution in transportation methods and routes.

Essentially, opposition to the Hudson's Bay Company following Coalition stemmed from two sources: the Red River area and the American fur trade establishment on the Missouri River. As early as 1835 the Company had attempted to appease the latter group by offering the American Fur Company

three hundred pounds sterling annually if it would withdraw from the Lake Superior, Lac La Pluie, Winnipeg, and Red River Districts.[139] However, this "bribe" provided little if any respite, since private trade continued unabated throughout the interior.

Unfortunately for the Company, American intruders were not its only problem. Following the famous Sayer trial of 1849, which freed the free traders, the Hudson's Bay Company was faced with a rising force of Red River entrepreneurs. The Company attempted to oppose the free traders by relying on "its superior knowledge of the fur trade, its reputation for goods of high quality , and its ability and willingness to sustain losses to discourage competitors."[140] It attempted to increase manpower at posts in the Pembina, Red River, and Swan River districts; and more importantly, it successfully applied a policy of "adequate supply." The Minutes of Council during the late 1850s and early part of the 1860s, indicate that both the number of servants and the quantity of goods provided in the annual outfits for the various districts of the Northern Department had increased dramatically. This policy was undertaken because it had been observed by Governor Simpson, that "when the Company's posts are well supplied with goods and provisions we succeed in securing the trade" with the Indians.[141] The Company posts were able to supply articles which the freetraders could neither afford to purchase nor transport across the plains.

Although the freetraders worked at a disadvantage in regard to the "civilized" quality and quantity of goods used in trade, Simpson was forced to acknowledge the expediency with which they could transport their goods to the eastern markets. By comparing the York Factory route with the Minnesota route, which utilized a combination of cart, steamboat, and rail transport, Simpson found that the Company was paying freight at the approximate rate of thirty-one pounds per ton, while the Americans were paying ten.[142] Not only was this a more than substantial saving for the freetraders in transport costs, the American route:

> ...relieve[d those who used it] from the necessity of estimating their wants several months in advance in order to forward their requisitions to England by the winter packet... [and] moreover, [it saved them] from uncertainty which attends the York route in reference to the ship's arrival at the Factory in time to get their supplies up the same season.[143]

The Hudson's Bay Company had always relied on this precarious water network for its success in the distribution of goods.

Goods arriving from London were stored in warehouses at York Factory before being shipped further inland by "York boat," involving numerous portages. The complexity of such a system lent itself to the possibility of numerous disasters. The Company was forced to change and its plans for carting goods south of the border revolutionized its transport system.

In 1859 Governor Simpson informed the Committee in London that:

> ...For several years past, it had been found impossible to keep up a sufficiently large or properly assorted stock to meet the demands upon us; that is, so long as we were entirely dependent on the York Factory line of communication ...For two or three years in succession our stores were so bare that, an opening was left to the petty traders and the Americans on the frontier to extend their operations, of which they were not slow to avail themselves, to the great detriment of the Company's interest.[144]

Simpson had been able to tie the proposals for a route change to his policy of sufficient supply. Within a year, Simpson's report had been followed by Resolution 35, in the Minutes of Council, which authorized the transport of all the Swan River District outfit, except York Factory made articles, rum, and gunpowder, by way of St. Paul's to Red River from where it could be "conveyed to the District by Carts,"[145] Even then, the York Factory brigades which were forced to use the old route during the 1860s were "victim both of epidemic and mismanagement."[146] Crews mutinied, and those that carried on lost many of the goods through their inexperience or lack of concern for Company property. As a result, each year greater portions of the Northern Department's indents moved via Red River. York Factory had seen its day. By 1874 it handled only coastal trade as it had at its inception. A year later Fort Garry became the headquarters of the Northern Department and York Factory's usefulness drew to a close, ending another chapter in fur trade history.

Endnotes

Abbreviation: H.B.C.A., P.A.M., - Hudson's Bay Company Archives, Provincial Archives of Manitoba.

1 Glyndwr Williams, "Highlights in the History of the First Two Hundred Years of the Hudson's Bay Company," The Beaver, (Autumn, 1970), p. 4.

2 As cited by Thorkild Hansen, The Way to Hudson Bay: The Life and Times of Jens Munk, translated by James McFarlane and John Lynch, (New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1970), p. 247.

3 Thorkild Hansen, The Way to Hudson Bay, (New York, 1970) p. 258.

4 As cited by Thorkild Hansen in ibid., p. 278. Note: A recent article by Delbert Young, "Was There An Unsuspected Killer Aboard 'The Unicorn'?," The Beaver (Winter, 1973), pp. 9-15, has suggested the possibility that Munk's men died of trichinosis after eating improperly cooked bear meat. It is an interesting hypothesis, but as yet unproved. For the purposes of this report I have assumed that the standard interpretation of death by scurvy is the correct one.

5 E.E. Rich, The History of the Hudson's Bay Company, 1670-1870, Volume I: 1670-1763 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1960), p. 24.

6 Glyndwr Williams, op. cit., p. 7.

7 As cited by Clifford Wilson, "Forts on the Twin Rivers," The Beaver (Winter, 1957), p. 4.

8 Clifford Wilson, "Forts on the Twin Rivers," The Beaver (Winter, 1957), p. 4. Note: In one year along, 1682, and "the two following, no less than seven posts were built at the mouths of the twin rivers."

9 E.E. Rich, op. cit., p. 135.

10 Ibid., p. 136.

11 Ibid., p. 137.

12 E.E. Rich, in The History of the Hudson's Bay Company, Volume I (Toronto, 1960), p. 148, suggests that Abraham's post was probably located on the north shore of Sir Edward Dering's Island. Grace Lee Nute, in "The French on the Bay," The Beaver (Winter, 1957), p. 33, describes Abraham's post as being "at Walker's Point on the south side of Nelson River." Further investigation into HBC Archives is necessary before the location is exactly identified.

13 E.E.Rich, op. cit., p. 234.

14 Ibid., p. 235.

15 As cited by W.A. Davies, "A Brief History of the Churchill River," The Musk-Ox (Vol. 15, 1975), p. 30.

16 Excerpt from Kelsey's notes printed in The Kelsey Papers, published by The Public Archives of Canada and The Public Record Office of Northern Ireland with an introduction by Arthur G. Doughty and Chester Martin, (Ottawa, 1929), p. 25.

17 Ibid., Journal reference; July 9, 1689, pp. 27-82.

18 Ibid., Journal reference; July 11, 1689, p. 28.

19 Ibid., Journal reference; August 3, 1689, pp. 31-32.

20 E.E. Rich, op. cit., p. 329.

21 Nicholas Jérémie, Twenty Years of York Factory, 1694-1714: Jérémie's Account of Hudson Strait and Bay, Edited and translated by R. Douglas and J.N. Wallace (Ottawa, 1926), p. 26. Note: There appears to be a discrepancy regarding the actual date of the capture. E.E. Rich in The History of the Hudson's Bay Company, Volume I (Toronto, 1960), p. 329, cites the surrender date as being the 14th or 15th, thereby agreeing with Jérémie's account. However, Henry Kelsey's journal as it appears in The Kelsey Papers (Ottawa, 1929) dates the surrender at October 4th. Grace Lee Nute in an article entitled, "The French on the Bay," The Beaver (Winter, 1957), p. 35, has perhaps used Kelsey as a reference and therefore dates the surrender at October 4th. It is, as yet, difficult to estimate which date is accurate.

22 Nicholas Jérémie, op. cit., p. 26.

23 The Kelsey Papers, op. cit., p. 100.

24 By the Treaty of Rysick, (September 20, 1697) the French were authorized to control the posts on James Bay while England was to assume command of York Fort. In actuality the opposite occurred: for a period of sixteen years the French controlled York Factory and the Company remained at the "Bottom of the Bay."

25 Nicholas Jérémie, op. cit., p. 35.

26 Ibid. Note: E.E. Rich in The History of the Hudson's Bay Company, Volume I (Toronto, 1960) p. 409, seems to feel that Fort Phelipeaux was on Severn River. However, because he does not cite the source, Jérémie's version has been accepted for the purpose of this paper.

27 Nicholas Jérémie, op. cit., p. 38.

28 This estimate in date was provided by R. Douglas and J.N. Wallace, footnote 61, p. 37 in Twenty Years of York Factory, 1694-1714: Jérémie's Account of Hudson Strait and Bay (Ottawa, 1926).

29 Nicholas Jérémie, op. cit., p. 38.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., p. 40.

33 Glyndwr Williams, op. cit., p. 13.

34 Ibid.

35 Nicholas Jérémie, op. cit., p. 42.

36 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A.6/4, fo. 9 - London Correspondence Outward - H.B.C. official, 1716-1726.

37 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., B.239/a/3, fo. 32d, - York Factory, Journal 1716-1717, Daily entry, March 5, 1717.

38 K.G. Davies (ed.), Letters from Hudson Bay 1703-40, (London: The Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1965), James Knight to Captain Merry, Deputy Governor, 19 September 1714, p. 38.

39 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A.6/4, fo. 9 - London Correspondence Outward - H.B.C. Official, 1716-1726, Dated: June 29, 1715.

40 J. Maurice, "Demographic Influences at York Fort 1714-1716," Historical and Scientific Society of Manitoba, (Series III, Number 26, 1969-1970), p. 47. Maurice states that Knight had been warned of the flood by an old Indian and therefore he placed most of the goods on the upper floors.

41 According to a map and accompanying index of "The Plan of the Old & New York Fort - Hay's River Hudson's Bay - America 1716."
H.B.C.A., P.A.M., G.2/29.

42 James Kenney (ed.), The Founding of Churchill - Being the Journal of Captain James Knight, Governor-in-Chief in Hudson's Bay, from the 14th of July to the 13th of September 1717, (London, J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1932), p. 60.

43 York Factory Journal, 10 September 1715 as cited by J. Maurice, "Demographic Influences...," op. cit., p. 49. [Original Reference: MG19, Series G, V.16, Hudson's Bay Company Records, Public Archives of Canada.]

44 J. Maurice, op. cit., pp. 52-53.

45 Ibid., p. 54.

46 York Factory Journal, 3 September 1716 as cited by J. Maurice, "Demographic Influences...," op. cit., p. 55. [Original Reference: MG19, Series G., V.17, Hudson's Bay Company Records, Public Archives of Canada.]

47 E.E. Rich (ed.), James Isham's Observations On Hudson's Bay, 1743 And Notes And Observations On a Book Entitled A Voyage to Hudson's Bay in the Dobbs Galley, 1749, Published by The Champlain Society for the Hudson's Bay Record Society, Volume XII, (London, 1949), p. xi.

48 Ibid.

49 According to Sylvia Van Kirk in her article, "Thanadelthur," The Beaver, (Spring, 1974), p. 41. Thanadelthur was the name of a Chipewyan Indian women who assisted the Hudson's Bay Company with its negotiations of peace between the Cree and Chipewyan. The name of Thanadelthur meant "marten snake" in the oral tradition of Chipewyan society.

50 K.G. Davies (ed.), Letters from Hudson Bay 1703-1740, The Hudson's Bay Record Society, Volume XXV (London, 1965), Appendix E, Biography of Slave Woman, p. 410.

51 Sylvia Van Kirk, op. cit., p. 41.

52 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., B.239/a/1, fo. 43, York Factory Journal 1714-15, Daily Entry: June 27, 1715.

53 K.G. Davies (ed.), op. cit., p. 411.

54 Ibid., p. 412, York Fort Journal - B.239/a/2, fos. 27-27d, 29.

55 This fort was built on the same site as the 1688 structures had once stood.

56 James Kenney (ed.), op. cit., pp. 125-126.

57 Ibid., pp. 168-169.

58 Ibid., p. 169.

59 Ibid., pp. 182, 186.

60 As cited by K.G. Davies (ed.), Letters from Hudson Bay, 1703-1740, The Hudson's Bay Record Society, Volume XXV (London, 1965), footnote 2, p. 64.

61 Ibid., Letter dated, 3 August 1723 from Prince of Wales's Fort, pp. 84-85.

62 Ibid., Letter dated, 23 August 1723, from York Factory, p. 94.

63 E.E. Rich, The Fur Trade and the Northwest to 1857 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1967), p. 101.

64 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A. 11/114, fo. 54d, - London Inward Correspondence - York Factory, 1 August 1729, Thomas Macklish to London.

65 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A.1/143, fo. 77d, Minute Book - Sub-Committee London 1717-1731, Dated, 18 March 1730.

66 Ibid., fo. 78d, Dated, 1 April 1731.

67 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A.6/5, fo. 51 - London Correspondence Outward, H.B.C. Official, 1727-1737, London Committee to Richard Norton, 20 May 1731.

68 E.E. Rich, The Fur Trade....op cit., p. 101.

69 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A.11/15, fo. 27 - London Letters Inward - from Churchill, 1774-1791, Samuel Hearne to London, 2 September 1776.

70 A.S. Morton, A History of the Canadian West to 1870-71, (Toronto: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1939), p. 227, lines 20-27.

71 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A.1/35, fo. 165 - Minute Book - Sub-Committee, 1739-1743, 3 April 1741.
Note: Thomas White assumed the position of Chief at York Factory in 1741 after James Isham was transferred to Prince of Wales's Fort. This decision was made by the Sub-Committee in London, 19 March 1740 (H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A.1/35, fo. 154): "The Committee came to a resolution that Mr. Thomas White be the Companys Chief at York Fort in the room of Mr. James Isham and Mr. James Isham be the Companys Chief at Prince of Wales's Fort Churchill River in the room of Mr. Richard Norton who is to come home."

72 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A.11/114, fos. 104-104d. - London Inward Correspondence - York Factory, 1716-1756, Thomas White to London, 10 August 1741.

73 Ibid., fo. 108, 10 August 1742.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid., fo. 112 - 18 August 1743.

76 Joseph Robson, An Account of Six Years Residence in Hudson's Bay from 1733-1736 (London: Printed for J. Payne and J. Bourget in Pater Noster Row: Mr. Kincaid at Edinburgh; Mr. Barry at Glasgow and Mr. J. Smith at Dublin, 1752), p. 30.

77 Ibid. Despite the resultant lack of readibility, the 18th century script for the letter "s" has been maintained in this quotation for purposes of textual consistency.

78 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A.11/115, fo. 77 - London Inward Correspondence - York Factory, 1757-1777, Ferdinand Jacobs to London, 4 September 1763.

79 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A.11/116, fo. 10d - London Inward Correspondence - York Factory, 1776-1787, Humphrey Martin to London, 31 August 1776.

80 Hudson's Bay House Library, York Factory File Folder (2), Typed extract from the Supplement a la Gazette de France [English translation], (Paris, 29 October 1782), p. 1.

81 E.E. Rich, The History of the Hudson's Bay Company, 1670-1870, Volume II: 1763-1820 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1960), p. 84.

82 Hudson's Bay House Library....op cit., p. 2.

83 Ibid., p. 3.

84 E.E. Rich, The History....op. cit., Volume II, p. 86.

85 Hudson's Bay House Library...op. cit., p. 5.

86 Ibid., p. 8.

87 Severn Fort had not been destroyed in 1782. La Perouse stated: "[Severn] is a small settlement dependant on York, which I did not destroy, as it was of no importance, and as my ships, without anchors or boats, and having 300 sick, could do nothing better than quit these areas...". Hudson's Bay House Library...op. cit., p. 8.

88 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A.11/15, fo. 101d - London Letters Inward - from Churchill, 1774-1791, Samuel Hearne to London, 25 September 1783.

89 Ibid.

90 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., B.42/b/26, fos. 9-9d, Letter Book - Churchill, 1783-84, Humphrey Marten (YF) to Samuel Hearne (Churchill), 6 January 1784.

91 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., B.42/b/26, fo. 11 - Letter Book - Churchill, 1783-84, Samuel Hearne (Churchill) to Humphrey Marten (YF), 19 January 1784.

92 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A.11/15, fo. 99 - London Letters Inward from Churchill, 1774-1791, Samuel Hearne (Churchill) to London, 25 September 1783.

93 Ibid., fo. 105d, - 10 September 1784.

94 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A.5/1, fo. 26 - London Correspondence Outward - General Series, 1753-1776, London to Ferdinand Jacobs, 23 May 1758.

95 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., B.42/b/44, fo. 14 - Churchill Letter Book - Inward and Outward, 1783-1801, Samuel Hearne

(Churchill) to London, 28 August 1785.

96 H.B.C.A., P.A.M. B.42/b/41, fo. 3d, - Churchill Letter Book, 1798-99, Thomas Stayner to Mr. Thomas (Moose Factory), 20 January 1799.

97 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., B.42/b/44, fo. 49 - Churchill Letter Book - Inward and Outward, 1783-1801, London to Thomas Stayner (Churchill) 29 May 1794.

98 Ibid., fo. 50d.

99 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., B.239/b/79, fo. 10 - General Letters to England - from York Factory, 1794 - 1809, Joseph Colen to London, 16 September 1795.

100 Ibid.

101 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., B.42/b/44, fo. 59 - Churchill Letter Book - Inward & Outward, 1783-1801, London to Thomas Stayner, 1 June 1796.

102 Ibid., fo. 54d, 30 May 1795.

103 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., B.239/b/79, fo. 13 - General Letters to England from York Factory, 1794-1809, Joseph Colen to London, 6 September 1796.

104 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., B.42/b/44, fos. 67-67d - Churchill Letter Book - Inward and Outward, 1783-1801, London to Thomas Stayner (Churchill), 31 May 1799.

105 Clifford Wilson, "Forts on the Twin River," The Beaver (Winter, 1957), p. 7.

106 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A.11/117, fo. 15 - London Inward Correspondence - York Factory, 1787-1797, Joseph Colen (YF), to London, August 1788.

107 Glyndwr Williams, op. cit., p. 16.

108 Joseph Robson...op. cit., p. 6.

109 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A.11/114, fos. 64-64d. - London Inward Correspondence - York Factory, 1716-1756, Thomas Macklish to London, 17 August 1732.

110 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A.5/1, fols 97d, 98- London Correspondence

Outward - General Series, 1753-1776, London to Ferdinand Jacobs (YF), 25 May 1769.

111 Glyndwr Williams, op. cit., p. 33.

112 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A.5/1, fo. 97d. - London Correspondence Outward, General Series, 1753-1776, London to Ferdinand Jacobs (YF), 25 May 1769.

113 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., B.42/b/20, fo. 12d - Churchill Letter Book, 1773-1774, Ferdinand Jacobs to London, 1 July 1774.

114 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A.11/116, fo. 41 - London Inward Correspondence - York Factory, 1776-1787, Humphrey Marten (YF) to London, 28 August 1778. Note: Made Beaver was the standard unit of evaluation in the Hudson's Bay Company's system of barter with the Indians. E.E. Rich in The Fur Trade and the Northwest to 1857, (Toronto, 1967), p. 59, explains the Made Beaver Standard thus: "All other skins were reduced to terms of the beaver, which was the unit of accountancy; and so the term "made beaver" assumed a meaning as all other skins were "made" into beaver, for which specialized amounts of tobacco, cloth gunpowder, beads, needles, or other goods were traded."

115 Calculated by computing the average figures reported by York Factory in their correspondence to London, during that period - H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A.11/114.

116 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A.11/114, fo. 41 - London Inward Correspondence - York Factory, 1776-1787, Humphrey Marten to London, 28 August 1778.

117 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., B.42/b/1b, fo. 5 - 'Copys of Letters Between Prince of Wales's Fort and the Other Factorys', 1754-1755, Ferdinand Jacobs (PWF) to James Isham (YF), 14 August 1755.

118 H.B.C.A, P.A.M., A.11/15, fo. 21 - London Letters Inward - from Churchill, 1774-1791, Adnrew Graham to London, 24 August 1775.

119 Glyndwr Williams, op. cit., p. 38.

120 E.E. Rich, The Fur Trade and the Northwest to 1857, (Toronto, 1967), p. 204.

121 Glyndwr Williams, op. cit., p. 38.

122 H.A. Innis in The Fur Trade in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1973), p. 285, has incorrectly stated that the Hudson's Bay Company was organized under four departments: the Montreal, the Southern, the Northern, and the Western. According to the actual Minutes of Council of the Hudson's Bay Company, the Columbia District, including New Caledonia (which Innis designates as the Western Department), was under the jurisdiction of the Northern Department.

123 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., B.239/e/1, fo. 2 - York Factory Report, Wm. H. Cook, 1 September 1815.

124 This division was summarized in H.B.C.A., P.A.M., B.239/z/1, fo. 21d - Miscellaneous Items, 1808-1823.

125 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., B.42/e/4, fo. 1 - Churchill Fort Report, Colin Robertson, 1825.

126 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., D.4/87, fo. 52 - Governor George Simpson - Official Reports to the Governor and Committee in London, Duplicate Letter Dated: 10 August 1824.

127 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., D.4/89, fo. 37.

128 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., D.4/98, fo. 33d.

129 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., D.4/89, fo. 45.

130 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., B.239/b/94, fo. 37 - Correspondence Books - York Factory (inward and outward entries) - James Hargrave to Duncan Finlayson, 21 May 1842.

131 Alvin C. Gluek, "The Fading Glory," The Beaver (Winter, 1957), p. 50.

132 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., B.239/k/2, fo. 2 - Minutes of Council: Northern Department, 1832.

133 R.H. Fleming (ed.), Minutes of Council, Northern Department of Rupert's Land 1821-1831 (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1940), p. xiii.

134 E.H. Oliver, The Canadian North West: Its Early Development and Legislative Records, Volume I, (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1914), p. 629.

135 Margaret Arnett MacLeod (ed.), The Letters of Letitia

Hargrave. Facsimile reprint of Volume 28 (1947) of The Champlain Society, (New York: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1969), Letitia to Mrs. Dugald Mactavish, York Factory, September 1840, p. 62.

136 Clifford Wilson, "Forts on the Twin Rivers," The Beaver (Winter, 1957), p. 11.

137 Ibid.

138 The complete memorandum was written by Chief Trader James Hargrave at York Factory in August, 1839. Edited with an Introduction by Margaret Arnett MacLeod in, "Memorandum Regarding the Affairs of York Factory, Winter Season, 1839-40," The Canadian Historical Review, Volume 29, no. 1 (March, 1948), pp. 44-53.

139 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., B.239/k/z, fo. 92 - Minutes of Council Northern Department, Resolution 46, 1835.

140 John S. Galbraith, The Hudson's Bay Company as an Imperial Factor 1821-1869, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), p. 77.

141 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A.12/8, fo. 3 - London Inward Correspondence from Governor George Simpson, 26 June 1856.

142 Ibid., fo. 46.

143 Ibid., fos. 46-47.

144 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., A.12/10, fo. 15d - London Inward Correspondence from Governor George Simpson, 21 June 1859.

145 H.B.C.A., P.A.M., B.239/k/3, fo. 207 - Minutes of Council Northern Department, Resolution 35, 1860-61.

146 Alvin C. Gluek, op. cit., p. 53.

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